401 lines
11 KiB
C
401 lines
11 KiB
C
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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#ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
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#define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
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#include <linux/static_key.h>
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#include <asm/alternative.h>
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#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
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#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
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#include <asm/msr-index.h>
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/*
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* Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
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*
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* Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
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* infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
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*
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* This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
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* mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
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* eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
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* purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
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* allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
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*
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* We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
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* inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
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* from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
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*/
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#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
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#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */
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/*
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* Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
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* the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation
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* trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
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*/
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#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \
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mov $(nr/2), reg; \
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771: \
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call 772f; \
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773: /* speculation trap */ \
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pause; \
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lfence; \
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jmp 773b; \
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772: \
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call 774f; \
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775: /* speculation trap */ \
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pause; \
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lfence; \
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jmp 775b; \
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774: \
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dec reg; \
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jnz 771b; \
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add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
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#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
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/*
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* This should be used immediately before a retpoline alternative. It tells
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* objtool where the retpolines are so that it can make sense of the control
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* flow by just reading the original instruction(s) and ignoring the
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* alternatives.
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*/
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.macro ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
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.Lannotate_\@:
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.pushsection .discard.nospec
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.long .Lannotate_\@ - .
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.popsection
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.endm
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/*
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* This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells
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* objtool the subsequent indirect jump/call is vouched safe for retpoline
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* builds.
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*/
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.macro ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
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.Lannotate_\@:
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.pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe
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_ASM_PTR .Lannotate_\@
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.popsection
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.endm
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/*
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* These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call.
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* Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE
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* invocation below less ugly.
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*/
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.macro RETPOLINE_JMP reg:req
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call .Ldo_rop_\@
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.Lspec_trap_\@:
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pause
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lfence
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jmp .Lspec_trap_\@
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.Ldo_rop_\@:
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mov \reg, (%_ASM_SP)
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ret
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.endm
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/*
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* This is a wrapper around RETPOLINE_JMP so the called function in reg
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* returns to the instruction after the macro.
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*/
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.macro RETPOLINE_CALL reg:req
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jmp .Ldo_call_\@
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.Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@:
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RETPOLINE_JMP \reg
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.Ldo_call_\@:
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call .Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@
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.endm
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/*
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* JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
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* indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
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* attack.
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*/
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.macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
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#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
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ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
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ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), \
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__stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
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__stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
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#else
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jmp *\reg
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#endif
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.endm
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.macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
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#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
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ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
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ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), \
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__stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\
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__stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
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#else
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call *\reg
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#endif
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.endm
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/*
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* A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
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* monstrosity above, manually.
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*/
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.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
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#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
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ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
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ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \
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__stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \
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\ftr
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.Lskip_rsb_\@:
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#endif
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.endm
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#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
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#define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
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"999:\n\t" \
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".pushsection .discard.nospec\n\t" \
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".long 999b - .\n\t" \
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".popsection\n\t"
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#define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
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"999:\n\t" \
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".pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe\n\t" \
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_ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t" \
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".popsection\n\t"
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#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(RETPOLINE)
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/*
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* Since the inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC,
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* the 64-bit one is dependent on RETPOLINE not CONFIG_RETPOLINE.
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*/
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# define CALL_NOSPEC \
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ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
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ALTERNATIVE( \
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ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
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"call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
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"call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n", \
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X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
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# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
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#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
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/*
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* For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
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* otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
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* here, anyway.
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*/
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# define CALL_NOSPEC \
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ALTERNATIVE( \
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ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
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"call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
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" jmp 904f;\n" \
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" .align 16\n" \
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"901: call 903f;\n" \
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"902: pause;\n" \
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" lfence;\n" \
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" jmp 902b;\n" \
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" .align 16\n" \
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"903: lea 4(%%esp), %%esp;\n" \
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" pushl %[thunk_target];\n" \
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" ret;\n" \
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" .align 16\n" \
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"904: call 901b;\n", \
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X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
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# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
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#else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
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# define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
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# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
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#endif
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/* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
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enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
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SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
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SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL,
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SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD,
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SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
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SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
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SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED,
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};
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/* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
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enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation {
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SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE,
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SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT,
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SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED,
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SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL,
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SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP,
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};
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/* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
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enum ssb_mitigation {
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SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
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SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
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SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL,
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SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP,
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};
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extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
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extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
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/*
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* On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
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* can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
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* retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
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* CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
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*/
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static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
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unsigned long loops;
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asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
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ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
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__stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)),
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X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
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"910:"
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: "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
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: : "memory" );
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#endif
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}
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static __always_inline
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void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
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{
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asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature])
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: : "c" (msr),
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"a" ((u32)val),
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"d" ((u32)(val >> 32)),
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[feature] "i" (feature)
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: "memory");
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}
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static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
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{
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u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
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alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
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}
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/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
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extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
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/*
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* With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
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* before calling into firmware.
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*
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* (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.)
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*/
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#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \
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do { \
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u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; \
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\
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preempt_disable(); \
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alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
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X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
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} while (0)
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#define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \
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do { \
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u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base; \
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\
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alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
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X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
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preempt_enable(); \
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} while (0)
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DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
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DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
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DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
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DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
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DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
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#include <asm/segment.h>
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/**
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* mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
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*
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* This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
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* combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
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* instruction is executed.
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*/
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static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
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{
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static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS;
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/*
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* Has to be the memory-operand variant because only that
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* guarantees the CPU buffer flush functionality according to
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* documentation. The register-operand variant does not.
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* Works with any segment selector, but a valid writable
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* data segment is the fastest variant.
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*
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* "cc" clobber is required because VERW modifies ZF.
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*/
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asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc");
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}
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/**
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* mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
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*
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* Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
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*/
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static __always_inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
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{
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if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear))
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mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
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}
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/**
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* mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
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*
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* Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
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*/
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static inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
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{
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if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear))
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mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
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}
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#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
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|
|
||
|
|
/*
|
||
|
|
* Below is used in the eBPF JIT compiler and emits the byte sequence
|
||
|
|
* for the following assembly:
|
||
|
|
*
|
||
|
|
* With retpolines configured:
|
||
|
|
*
|
||
|
|
* callq do_rop
|
||
|
|
* spec_trap:
|
||
|
|
* pause
|
||
|
|
* lfence
|
||
|
|
* jmp spec_trap
|
||
|
|
* do_rop:
|
||
|
|
* mov %rax,(%rsp)
|
||
|
|
* retq
|
||
|
|
*
|
||
|
|
* Without retpolines configured:
|
||
|
|
*
|
||
|
|
* jmp *%rax
|
||
|
|
*/
|
||
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
|
||
|
|
# define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT_SIZE 17
|
||
|
|
# define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT() \
|
||
|
|
EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7); /* callq do_rop */ \
|
||
|
|
/* spec_trap: */ \
|
||
|
|
EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90); /* pause */ \
|
||
|
|
EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */ \
|
||
|
|
EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9); /* jmp spec_trap */ \
|
||
|
|
/* do_rop: */ \
|
||
|
|
EMIT4(0x48, 0x89, 0x04, 0x24); /* mov %rax,(%rsp) */ \
|
||
|
|
EMIT1(0xC3); /* retq */
|
||
|
|
#else
|
||
|
|
# define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT_SIZE 2
|
||
|
|
# define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT() \
|
||
|
|
EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0); /* jmp *%rax */
|
||
|
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
#endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */
|